the ICR and the IMP. shall develop a process to provide a transition plan for hand -over of. IMP security responsibilities overtime. The IMP. Ahtisarijev plan je dinamit za ceo svet! # AM – 28 Mar. Međutim, na kraju EU je ključ. Ahtisarijev plan predviđa slanje specijalnog predstavnika sa velikim brojem članova osoblja da koordinira civilno.
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Vreme je da se ovo shvati i da se deluje. The 19 April agreement between Kosovo and Serbia is an earthquake in Balkan politics: It is too soon to try to say what it all means. For now clarity comes from focusing on the few patches of firm ground. There are only two sure things about abtisarijev agreement, both are very important, and neither is spelled out anywhere in its text.
The first is that the Serbian government has given up on keeping northern Kosovo in its system and has ceded its authority to Pristina. The second is that Belgrade has implicitly recognised that Kosovo is a state. These are tectonic shifts, whose effects will be felt no matter what happens with the early attempts to implement the deal. The Path to Normalistion. Hide Footnote The dual name is another sign of trouble ahead: What Belgrade and Pristina have initialed is not so much an agreement as a set of principles that plah be elaborated before they can be implemented, and plna elaboration can be as hard-fought as the agreement itself.
Consider the second point:. Its dissolution shall only take place ahgisarijev a decision of the participating municipalities. The first sentence is silent as to who shall legislate the statute: The second implies the entity cannot be dissolved by a ahtisarjjev decision, which suggests it is to have some kind of constitutional status.
Most of the other points are as diaphanous as this one, amenable to different readings and needing ahtjsarijev lot of follow-up work to give them life. Followers of the history of EU mediation between Belgrade and Pristina will recognise this ambiguity as the Brussels house pla The advantage of this approach lies in making possible agreements that would be politically deadly if spelled out in black and white.
The cost, however, is steep. Both sides can feel cheated, and Belgrade especially tends to squeal when implementation begins on terms that were only implied in the text itself.
Much of the agreement depends on the cooperation of the northern Kosovo Serbs and their leaders, all of whom reject the deal and promise to resist. This community athisarijev a bad ahtiszrijev these days; they are portrayed as extremists, criminals, or at best simply too few in number to matter. That portrait is unfair: Rejection of the Belgrade-Pristina deal comes from a bedrock patriotism that is common to most populations who see state borders shift against their will.
Given the near-total absence of law enforcement, the area is surprisingly peaceful; since Kosovo declared independence in there have been only four fatalities in the North linked to the dispute.
During pkan times, improvised bombs explode and pot shots ring out, but are meant to warn or intimidate and seldom injure anyone.
Pomeranje Kosova sa mrtve tacke: evropska odgovornost | Crisis Group
The two governments should coordinate the ahtiarijev of all security sector staff in Kosovo from Belgrade payroll and jurisdiction to Pristina, which entails: It is important the two capitals work together to ensure no interruption in payment and no interregnum during which displaced cops can be recruited by organised crime.
Implementing the agreement will require both countries to amend the relevant legislation. One or both may have to amend their constitutions. The issues will have to be athisarijev in public, members of parliament will have to take stands. Early signs are not encouraging. They have yet to digest its implications, and early reactions bear a distinct resemblance to the five stages of grief: They seem to hope the deal will die without their cooperation, but have no real plan.
Their preference — the status quo, ignoring Ahtiswrijev and ahtisarijsv integrated into the Serbian system — is no longer possible. The limiting factors are legal as in many ex-communist states, workers have many rights and are hard to fire and political they do not want to provoke a televised exodus, even a small one.
One ironic component of this story is ahtisadijev Serbia will probably be tacitly encouraged to violate olan own laws by the EU to make all this work, as doing it properly — amending ahtsiarijev the relevant legislation and regulation — would take much longer than Brussels prefers. Serbia wants to form the Community quickly, out of the existing municipal governments; name a senior Serb police officer to take charge of integrating the illegal Serbian security presence into Kosovo institutions; and transfer the existing Serbian court to Kosovo jurisdiction.
These steps would bundle the local population and their leaders into a loose Kosovo jacket that could be tightened over time as tempers cool. Kosovo wants to defer forming the Association until the OSCE organises local elections; supervise the transfer of security officials; and dissolve the Serbian court and staff a new Kosovo court.
Northerners can easily boycott or sabotage all of those measures and probably remain confident that Pristina would stick to its positions. Dual Sovereignty in Practice. Hide Footnote with a large arsenal ranging from community pllan and civil disobedience to organised boycotts, intimidation and occasional pitched battles.
But ahtisarijsv do not know how to fight Belgrade. Pristina would surely reject such a law and see it as an insult; yet it would leave the North no legal avenue to keep rejecting integration into the Kosovo system. The North is thinking of three options. It can submit to integration into the Kosovo system, and work to expand the space of autonomy it offers them. It can declare ahtisarijve, with an aim of negotiating a better deal with one or both of the states that claim it.
Or it can strike out on its own without any formal declarations, subverting and obstructing the agreement where it can and ahtlsarijev for a re-negotiation. Curiously, all three courses lead toward the same place: The differences are in emphasis and symbolism, emotionally powerful but with modest practical implications. Pristina and Belgrade should refrain from sudden or provocative moves.
So far there has been no surge in violence against Kosovo institutions in the North but that ahtisarijeev a risk in the near future, with the North Mitrovica Administrative Office and its staff being the most obvious targets. These should be protected. There is no point holding elections without significant local support. If the North is firmly opposed, there is a risk of violence against the organisers, and polls that require hefty KFOR protection would be of little use.
Belgrade and Pristina need to explain, in detail, what the agreement means for northern Kosovo.
They should take the time necessary to prepare the ground. This is the first high level agreement between the two states, and shows that Serbia can deal with Kosovo as an equal. It is a kind of de facto recognition of Kosovo and that may be its greatest long-term significance.
Whatever else happens, it is easier today to imagine that Serbia may one day formally recognise the independence of its former province. Yet the thaw in Belgrade-Pristina relations is still fragile and easy to reverse.
Both capitals should make improving their bilateral ties the priority, and should not allow lingering disagreements over northern Kosovo to impede them. Better state-to-state relations are much more important than administrative details governing the North.
Reversing a Dangerous Decision. Time for a Modest Deal: How to Get U. Download pdf to continue reading the full report. Consider the second point: Related Tags Kosovo Serbia.